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Foreword
“It’s this kind of association for hobbyist-thinkers. It should be 
obvious that we don’t ask for statements from all of them. I’m sure 
there are many associations we haven’t asked for statements,” said 
Liedes, explaining his ministry’s position… 
“Our requests aim to approach those parties which are stakeholders. 
There are quite a few parties whom it is simply not possible to 
ask.”1 (Karhu 2001)
Copyright law used to be niche legislation without much relevance 
outside publishing houses and record studios. The law had insignificant 
direct effects on normal citizens and as a consequence did not draw much 
attention from politicians.  Even the legal profession was not that interested 
because there was relatively little money to be made in this (then) obscure 
area of law.
The author of this study entered “the scene” at the time the wind of change 
had started – first as an observer, soon also as an active participant.  Interest 
in this subject was triggered by the fate of Anon.penet.fi, an anonymous 
remailing service run by Juhan “Julf” Helsingius. Helsingius was forced 
to close the service down after Finnish Police threatened to confiscate his 
server based on allegations from Scientologists that the service was used 
to distribute their copyrighted materials.
The case was widely discussed in SFNET and USENET and even led 
to the first Internet-related demonstrations—one of which the author 
was arranging in Helsinki. The author also had the chance to observe 
developments firsthand that led to court cases like RTC vs. NetCom that 
laid the foundation for first-generation copyright rules on the Internet. 
1. Author’s free translation  
One thing led to another and the author, together with his peers, founded 
Electronic Frontier Finland (EFFI) in 2001 to fight for freedom of speech 
and against over-reaching regulation of the Internet. One of the first cases 
undertaken by EFFI was national implementation of EU’s Copyright in 
Information Society Directive. That process is not described here as it is 
sufficient to note that it raised many questions in the author’s mind that 
this dissertation aims to answer; for example, why didn’t Jukka Liedes 
believe that Internet users were valid stakeholders in the process?
The thank-you list for this work could be very long and I know I’m going 
to miss many people who should be on it, and for that I apologize.
First, I’m very lucky to have an amazing family (mom, dad, sister) who 
has always been there for me, even during the darkest hours. Without 
them, this work would not exist. Second, Pauliina—my love—has played 
a central role in this work. Without her threats to color my hair red if no 
progress was made, this work would never have been finished.  
This dissertation owes a lot to my colleagues at HIIT, where I started 
my academic career. Jukka Kemppinen and Olli Pitkänen taught me a lot 
about the intrinsic details of the copyright system, among other things. 
As benevolent leader of the institute, Professor Martti Mäntylä both kept 
the administration from disturbing the actual work and offered insightful 
answers to my many questions. The months spent with Risto Sarvas at SIMS 
in Berkeley were, first of all, very fun but also helped me to understand a 
lot about other disciplines. Herkko Hietanen was always the person from 
whom I sought new perspectives on old questions – and great company on 
road trips and other adventures. Aura Soininen and Perttu Virtanen were 
the persons I turned to when I needed solid legal advice. Last but not least, 
Tommo Reti  helped me understand how technology could and could not 
be used to solve copyright-related problems.
Three people played special roles in this dissertation. Professor Kalle Määttä 
was my original supervisor while I was preparing this work at University 
of Joensuu. In that role he helped me in countless ways and bought me 
many drinks while we discussed the fine details of the economics of IPRs. 
Unfortunately, as a result of the very cruel nature of academic funding, I 
had no other choice but to move the project to TKK. This is something 
I’m sorry about. 
The second person is Professor Juha Laine. As my second supervisor he 
gently pushed me to finish this work while taking care of most of the 
practical arrangements. Finally and most significantly, Mikko Välimäki 
offered invaluable support for this work. For some odd reason, we share 
a passion for the strangest details of copyright; in other words, few people 
are genuinely excited about a just arrived used book, which describes 
the copyright system of the old Soviet Union. On other hand, we tend to 
disagree (often loudly) about the aforementioned details. As a result our 
relationship has been intellectually highly stimulating, and the articles in 
this dissertation would not exist without that or, of course, without his 
later detailed practical help.  
Dissertation examiners professor Juha Karhu and Professor Matti 
Heimonen made a number of comments to a draft version of this work, 
which improved the outcome substantially. They also kept the time limit 
with admirable precision, of which I’m very grateful. Professor Giovanni 
Ramello accepted the invitation to act as the academic opponent of the 
work with full knowledge of the weather conditions he’ll be facing in 
Helsinki. 
A very special thanks goes also to TEKES. The articles in this dissertation 
were written mostly while the author was working at TEKES-funded 
MobileIPR, RIPOS, and OSSI-projects. Other crucial financial support 
came from the Finnish Culture Foundation and the Business Education 
Fund, which helped the author survive periods of no project funding and 
also participate in international conferences. Finally, support from GEBSI 
helped to finalize the book.  
A different but equally important support for this work was provided 
by professor Marjatta Leirisalo-Repo and her colleagues and doctor Ville 
Remes at Helsinki University Central Hospital. They kept me in good 
enough condition to complete this work by offering the best possible 
cutting edge care. 
One more thing – thanks should also go to the PepsiCo, because without 
Pepsi Max this work would not exist.
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Original articles
The dissertation is based on five publications and a concluding first 
chapter. The abstracts of the publications are presented below. The full 
articles make up Appendixes 1-5. 
Article 1
Ville Oksanen - Mikko Välimäki: Transnational Advocacy Network 
Opposing DRM - Technical and Legal Challenge to Media Companies. 
Journal of Media Management 3/2002 (Volume 4, Issue 3)
Organized transnational political and technological activism—here 
referred to as transnational advocacy networks—is playing an increasingly 
strong role in giving ideas of how one should behave and what to consume. 
This article analyses transnational advocacy networks that oppose digital 
rights management (DRM) systems and related regulations. We suggest the 
potential impact of this activity to the consumption of content products. 
We start by defining and describing the most relevant advocacy networks. 
We provide the characterization of existing organizations and their work 
in both the United States and Europe. Then, we discuss four case studies 
where media companies have experimented with different strategies against 
DRM circumvention initiated and endorsed by transnational advocacy 
networks. Our argument is that because of the economics of copying 
from the Internet, it is not a sound strategy to use legal actions to remove 
any circumventing information from the Internet. Any circumvention 
information published on the Internet will be mirrored out of the reach 
of legal enforcement mechanisms. So far, the only working strategy seems 
to be to implement a DRM- system, which can be updated without user 
intervention after the security is breached. This might also be the most 
-12-
efficient way to control the impact of transnational advocacy networks 
opposing DRM systems.
Article 2 
Mikko Välimäki - Ville Oksanen: DRM Interoperability and 
Intellectual Property Policy in Europe,. European Intellectual 
Property Review 11/2006, (Volume 26, Issue 11), pp. 562-568.
Abstract
The article examines the scope of digital rights management (DRM) 
interoperability under EC copyright, consumer, and competition laws, 
and comments on the absence of specific interoperability provisions under 
European Parliament and Council Directive 2001/29, the situation under 
Council Directive 91/250, U.S. policy, and whether the French approach 
offers a potential way forward. Considers the extent to which EC 
competition law may be used to enforce DRM interoperability and whether 
consumer protection measures may achieve a similar result. Discusses 
whether interoperability should be recognized as a principle under the EC 
intellectual property regime and how this could be achieved.
Article 3 
Ville Oksanen - Mikko Välimäki: Theory of Deterrence and Individual 
Behaviour - Can Lawsuits Control File Sharing on the Internet? 
Review of Law & Economics 3/2007 (Volume 3, Issue 3), 694-714
Abstract
The music and movie industries have recently added individual consumers 
as the target of the file sharing lawsuits. It is often questioned why the 
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industries  use substantial resources to fight in the courtrooms instead 
of making better and more affordable products. In this article, we first 
analyze the reasons of the industry behavior, suggesting that the court 
strategy may be in fact more effective, at least in the short term, than it 
should be, based on pure economic calculations. We argue that lawsuits 
send in the first place a signal to individuals about the society’s supposedly 
negative attitude towards file sharing. General deterrence from the threat 
of being sued is secondary because people are risk seeking in the face of 
making a decision between certain and probable loss. In conclusion, we 
maintain that the court strategy can be used indirectly to establish a social 
norm, which can have a long lasting effect on individual behavior.
Article 4
Ville Oksanen - Mikko Välimäki: Free Software and Copyright 
Enforcement - A Tool for Global Copyright Policy? Knowledge, 
Technology & Policy Winter 2006 (Volume 18, Issue 4), 101-112.
Abstract 
One of the paradoxes of the free software ideology is its reliance on the 
legal institutions it was created to object. One could argue that Free 
Software Foundation is using copyright to enforce their free software 
licenses as aggressively as Business Software Alliance is enforcing its clients’ 
copyrights. We will show that the reality is more complex and that there is 
a significant difference: the free software community uses primarily non-
legal enforcement methods and trusts on social norms. 
We argue that free software could be used as a tool to make copyright more 
accepted in the less developed world because of its positive connection 
with copyright and community based approach. We explain why strong 
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copyright is also in the interest of free software developers. The article 
concludes by suggesting that World Intellectual Property Organization 
should include free software into its development agenda.
Article 5
Ville Oksanen - Mikko Välimäki: Copyright Levies as an 
Alternative Compensation Method for Recording Artists and 
Technological Development. Review of Economic Research on 
Copyright Issues 2/2005 (Volume 2, Issue 2), pp. 25-39 
Abstract
The idea of alternative compensation methods for recording artists has 
gained increasing popularity as Internet copying has started to seriously 
threaten record sales. Alternatives such as collective (blanket) licenses or 
levies to recording devices or Internet connections are not only promoted 
by cyber liberty organizations like Electronic Frontier Foundation but also 
by academics. We start this article by looking at the general theory of 
alternatives to copyright royalties and show that recording artist income 
is in practice not dependent on record sales. Music industry is much larger 
than the recording industry. Then we move forward and map the features 
of the current alternative proposals as well as their critiques. We end the 
first part of the article by presenting critique of the proposals and construct 
yet another iteration of a levy-based compensation method – this time 
with the users having the power to vote how the levies are distributed.
In the second part we analyze what our model would mean in Finland. 
We start this section by describing the current situation with the Finnish 
copyright law and the levy-system. We discuss shortly the governmental 
subsidies to the music industry. We then show what kind of changes would 
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be needed to implement our system and how the changes would be most 
likely against both EU copyright directive and WIPO copyright treaties. 
Not discouraged, we move on to calculate how the legislation would work 
in economic terms. In the end of this section we also aim to predict how 
the proposed model would affect the income of recording artists and the 
music industry at large. 
In the third and final part we reflect the idea of a levy-based compensation 
method to the current predictions of technical advances in communication 
networks. We especially pay attention to two factors, which are the price 
of storage capacity and communication speed. We show that consumers 
do not need for effective music sharing any faster connections than they 
have now. The traditional copyright royalty model is seriously threatened 
by tremendous personal copying covering practically all the music ever 
created. We conclude this article by discussing what this will mean to the 
alternative compensation proposals and the music industry in general.
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1. Introduction
“Copyright law is totally out of date. It is a Gutenberg artifact. 
Since it is a reactive process, it will probably have to break down 
totally before it is corrected” (Negroponte 1995, p. 58)
Nicholas Negroponte wrote this often quoted prediction more than a 
decade ago. A lot has happened during that decade to make the prediction 
seem likely to come true. However, there have been also significant 
developments that have seemed to take away its foundations.2 A short 
answer to the question, “what is this dissertation all about?” could be 
given as “finding out how well Negroponte’s prediction is holding up.” 
In other words, this dissertation aims to give a detailed view of how well 
copyright law is working in the digital environment and how its future 
looks. 
The main content of this dissertation, comprising five original articles, can 
be found in Appendixes I-V. The articles cover a relatively wide range of 
themes, with the common denominator being the process of adaptation 
of copyright to the digital realm. As required for this kind of dissertation, 
the articles are summarized in this first chapter together with some 
additional material considered essential or beneficial for the goal of the 
dissertation.3 
This first chapter is divided into four parts. The work starts by giving 
the reader a primer on two central topics in the dissertation, i.e., an 
overview of technological developments that have changed once again 
the environment of copyright law work and the economic background of 
2. The emergence of peer-to-peer technologies belongs without doubt to the first category and 
legislative efforts like the WIPO Internet Treaties and their implementations Digital Millennium 
Copyright Act (DMCA) and EU Copyright Directive (EUCD) to the second.
3. To follow the rules and the tradition, no new research or results as such are introduced in 
this introduction.
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copyright and IPRs. The second section is about the more formal details 
(research questions and method) of this dissertation. Summaries of the 
original articles are provided in the fourth section. Finally, the chapter 
closes with concluding remarks that tie together the various ideas of the 
articles and of this chapter. 
1.1. Copyright and Digital Technology
One of the most commonly heard fictions about copyright law is that it 
is a “technology neutral” form of legislation. In reality the development 
of copyright law has gone hand in hand with technological development. 
Of course, basic rights have remained relatively intact during its existence 
but there is continual need for new specific regulation of new technologies 
affecting the production and distribution of protected works.  Of course, 
these changes have not always been easy or very timely since there have 
been powerful conflicting interests at play. For example, during the last 
century, the introduction of radio, TV, cable TV, copy machines, VCRs, 
and computers all necessitated long and heated processes to adapt this 
“technology neutral” law to the new technological realities. However, none 
of these processes has been as profound for the copyright system as the 
simultaneous effect of digitization and emergence of global information 
networks. 
The magnitude of the change has been caused by three primary factors. 
First, rapid digitization has made it possible to make perfect copies of 
copyrighted works. Even though analog copying has been possible for 
quite some time, it did not pose as big a problem because serial copying 
was difficult as a result of at least some degeneration of quality between 
generations of copies. With digital copies, there is no such problem. The 
software industry faced this problem first by the very (digital) nature of 
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their product. Soon the music industry realized that it was in the same 
quagmire with its full digital non-copy-protected CD format.  The movie 
industry was more cautious, but to no avail—DVDs offered perfect masters 
for digital copying after their sub-par copy protection was broken. Among 
traditional major copyright industries, only book publishers have so far 
avoided mass-scale digital copying of their products. However, that is only 
because most people still prefer the interface of traditional books over e-
book readers.
The second factor is humongous development of silicon-based technology. 
The price of computers has gone down as fast as Moore’s law has predicted. 
This had made it possible for ordinary households to get hardware that 
was formerly only in the domain of the wealthiest corporations. This has 
had twofold consequences. First, it gives consumers the tools needed to 
store and copy works from digital masters in mass scale. However, an even 
more profound change has occurred in regard to the production costs of 
works. A typical home laptop can nowadays act as a recording studio, 
film cutting tool, and photo lab. The rise of open source and free software 
has boosted this effect further, since it has made a lot of very powerful 
tools legally and freely available to users.  This means that the production 
of the works has been “democratized”; i.e., a talented person does not 
necessarily need corporate backing to create professional-quality music or 
movies. This means that the traditional division between producers, users 
(i.e., corporate users such as TV companies), and consumers has lost most 
of its substance.
The third factor is the development of communication technologies. As 
long as there was no inexpensive way to mass distribute works among 
consumers, the content industry had at least one card left up its sleeve. 
However, the Internet broke this final barrier.  The key feature here has 
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actually been the very decentralized design of the Internet. The development 
of wireless communication has so far not been as important a factor, but 
as explained later in more detail, it will be.
A very good case for demonstrating this development is the Finnish 
amateur movie Starwreck, which is a “mashup” of the Babylon 5 and 
Star Trek series. The quality of the full-length film—especially its digital 
effects—is similar to its commercial counterparts despite the fact that 
the effects and editing were done on home computers.4 The film is freely 
distributed over the Internet with the help of BitTorrent technology, sharing 
the burden of required bandwidth with the downloaders, which has been 
crucial since downloads number in the millions. The film is being sold as 
a commercial DVD even it freely available. Additional income for project 
has been created with the sale of different merchandize like T-shirts and 
keyrings and donations from the community. Both the creation, financing 
and distribution of the film in this fashion would have been impossible 
without these technological breakthroughs.
1.1.1. Peer-to-Peer Technology
As just noted, the role of so-called peer-to-peer (P2P) technologies has been 
central as an enabler of unlimited distribution of (commonly unlicensed) 
copies. This dissertation delves now into more detail in an effort to further 
understand the exact nature of this phenomenon. 
The groundwork for P2P was created while the technical architecture of 
the Internet was being laid down during the early 1970s. The architecture 
was aimed to work in as decentralized a manner as possible. Thus the 
“intelligence” has to be located in the end-nodes of the system, which 
is totally opposite the functioning of “plain old phone networks,” which 
4. The movie is available at http://www.starwreck.com/. One might say that the quality of acting 
leaves something to be desired.
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rely on centralized control units (switching boards, etc.). Another critical 
design choice was a layered structure to separate the infrastructure from 
the services using it (see, e.g., Cerf 1974).
As Lessig (2001, pp. 44-48) and others have described in detail, without 
this “end-to-end” nature of the Internet, users would not have been able 
to empower themselves, since disrupting innovations like peer-to-peer 
technologies would have been blocked with very high certainty by the 
incumbents. However, it took more than two decades before the P2P-
technologies and Internet itself ware mature enough to break into the 
mainstream.5
Shawn Fanning’s Napster was therefore the first application to release 
the full potential of P2P in 1998. The design of the system was not fully 
distributed (see table 1), as the database of shared files was located in 
the central server. This made the system more controllable, which was 
reasonable from a technical and business perspective. It also made the 
system more vulnerable to legal attacks as it was easy to argue that the 
company had exact knowledge of what was being shared and also a means 
to stop the unlicensed sharing. 
Apparently Fanning and his corporate backers believed they could negotiate 
a license for the service from the music industry and start charging users 
for connecting to the system. Since they already had the data on shared 
files, it should have been relatively easy to share the collected income with 
the rights-holders e.g. similarly as the income from radio broadcasts is 
being shared. However, at that point such a proposal had no chance of 
success in the corporate boardrooms of the Big Four. Instead, the record 
5. It should be pointed out that Usenet-protocol, which describes a global, decentralized, 
distributed Internet discussion system, had already been created in 1979 by Duke University 
graduate students Tom Truscott and Jim Ellis. The system was arguably the first widely used P2P 
system and was also the target of the first major copyright litigation pertaining to the Internet 
(see Article 3 for more details).
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companies sued Napster into oblivion.
As a result, file-sharing technologies moved away from centralized P2P 
to hybrid and pure p2p systems (see table 1). These systems were seen as 
more resistant to legal attacks since the companies behind the software 
had no direct control over what the users were doing. However, the music 
industry’s successful court cases against Grokster and Sherman Networks 
(the creator of KaZaA) proved this theory effectively wrong (e.g., Ginsburg 
& Ricketson, 2006).
Table 1. Summary of characteristic features of client/server and peer-to-peer 
networks (Eberspächer et al., 2004)
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However, even if the court cases succeeded against corporate backers of 
P2P, this did not end the development of the systems. P2P software has 
continued to flourish in different open source projects with no legal entity 
to sue. One might thus argue that the outcome was actually a classic pyrrhic 
victory for the content industry since with corporate entities it would 
have been possible to develop mutually beneficial licensing agreements (as 
Napster had most likely planned to do).6
It should be pointed out that P2P-technology is used nowadays for much 
more than unlicensed sharing of music and videos. For example the most 
popular voice-over-IP application Skype is using its users to route the 
traffic of the system. Similarly there are tens of projects and commercial 
entities that leverage P2P to offer streaming video services (e.g. SCVI.net, 
2008a and SCVI.net, 2008b).
However, the early visions of the P2P super-distribution of commercial 
material have not realized. (see Soininen & al, 2003) For example, recently 
a company “Qtrax.com” claimed that it had secured licenses from the four 
major labels to start its service as “first legal p2p service” but the record 
companies disclaimed the information and the service is still unavailable. 
The fundamental problem with these services is that they compete directly 
with illegal services, which can offer their content free of DRM - and free 
of charge, too. (Kafka, 2008) 
In addition, the picture in “pure” file sharing is more complex than what 
one can read from mainstream press.  As described earlier in the case 
of Starwreck, P2P is widely used already today to distribute different 
legal content. The most classical example is the Linux distributions but 
6. The action was recently awarded as “the biggest record-company screwup of all time” 
while Decca Records A&R exec’s decision not to sign Beatles was number 2. (Dolan, Eells & 
Goodman, 2008) 
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the list of uses and users is much longer. For example, it is possible to 
download with BitTorrent Richard Stallman’s video lectures about new 
GNU General Public License. (Stallman, 2007). Similarly, Nine Inch Nails 
released their Ghost I and Slip-album in several Torrent-sites (Santo, 2008). 
Even traditional “pirate sites” like ThePirateBay host nowadays material 
from artists, which not only approve the distribution of their content but 
also rely on the support from the community as one of their sources of 
income. 
1.2. Economics of Copyright
1.2.1.  Economic Importance of Copyright Industries
This section discusses the economic importance of copyright industries 
for current society. It is intended that this also serve as an introduction to 
the field and hopefully create a foundation for the reader to understand 
what copyright-based industries actually are, on what kinds of rights the 
industry is founded, and why the political and economic stakes are very 
high.
 
To begin with, it is anything but easy to have good empirical results on the 
importance of copyright industries. The task is even harder if the results 
are comparable between different studies. 
To raise the quality and usability of the studies, WIPO launched a project 
in 2002 to create a unified way of measuring the effect of copyright 
industries on Gross Domestic Product (GDP).  The main part of the project 
took place in Helsinki in July 2002 and was chaired by Jukka Liedes.7 The 
outcome was the WIPO Guide on Surveying the Economic Importance 
Contribution of the Copyright-based Industries. Gantchev (2004, p. 6) 
7. The other participants were Antonio Buainain, Ahmed Ghoneim, Robert Picard, Stephen 
Siwek, Jules Theeuwes, Jeremy  Thorpe, Ruth Towse, and Richard Watt.
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describes the content of the guide:
In a nutshell the Guide provides detailed recommendations on 
how to establish the share of copyright-based economic activities 
in the GDP, employment and foreign trade. To this end it describes 
various existing approaches to measuring GDP, considerations 
that need to be taken into account when establishing employment 
in the copyright-related sectors and their share in foreign trade.
Because copyright law is harmonized more or less internationally, the guide 
presents the relevant rights that form the basis of copyright industries, as 
presented in Table 2.
Right Scope of the Market
Right of reproduction Reproduction of the works in a material or 
non-material form. It might also cover the 
adaptation of works.
Right of distribution Dissemination of physical copies; resale, sale 
and rental, and even lending of copies of 
such categories of works as musical works, 
including phonograms, audiovisual works, 
and computer programs. It might also cover 
the importation of copies.
Right of communication to the 
public
Relaying of works by any distant communi-
cation means. It might embrace a broad field 
of activities including the relaying of a perfor-
mance to members of the public outside the 
place where the performance was made, the 
transmission by cable and the making avail-
able of works through digital networks.
Right of public performance Live performances of works in the presence 
of the public (including by means of record-
ing phonograms).
Right of broadcasting Transmission of works through wireless and 
non-interactive means intended for public 
reception. It also embraces satellite transmis-
sions intended for public reception.
Table 2. Copyright and the scope of copyright markets (Gantchev, 2004, p. 7)
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The guide also defines the relevant industries, as shown in Table 3. The 
idea has been to divide the industries based on the importance of the role 
of copyright as an asset.
Category Definition Industries
Core copyright 
industries
Industries that produce copy-
righted works and other subject 
matter. Industries that would not 
exist without copyright.
Literature and press, 
music theater, film and 
video, photography, vi-
sual arts, radio and TV, 
software and databases, 
architecture, advertis-
ing, industrial design 
Other 
copyright 
industries 
(partial)
Industries whose operations are 
related to production, distribu-
tion, and use of copyrighted 
works. Part of industry’s output 
is copyright related. Industries 
that would be much smaller with-
out copyrighted works and other 
subject matter. 
Jewelry, furniture, 
household china and 
glass, clothing and foot-
wear, toys and games, 
wall coverings and car-
pets, engineering
Non-dedicated 
support 
industries
Industries that rely remotely on 
copyright material but are still 
relevant as copyright generates 
some part of their business
Telephony, Internet, 
transportation, general 
wholesale
Table 3. Copyright industries (Gantchev, 2004; Picard & Toivonen, 2004)
Some studies have already applied the proposed methodology. How and 
Leo (2005) used it in Singapore. They found that the contribution was S$8.7 
billion (value added) and that the industry employed 118,600 workers in 
2001, accounting for 5.7% of GDP and 5.8% of national employment. 
Similarly, Buainain et al. (2005) found that copyright industries generated 
approximately 6.74% of Brazilian GDP in 1998 and were responsible for 
5% of total employment and occupation. Siwek (2006) updated the U.S. 
figures to show $760.49 billion or 6.48% of the U.S. economy and 4.07% 
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share of the total workforce in 2004.8
However, the methodology suggested by the guide can be criticized. First, 
the actual relationship between rights assigned by copyright and their 
importance to different industries is anything but simple.9 For example, 
open source–based solutions have become more important in the software 
industry—is the income generated by copylefted products like Linux 
or MySQL excluded from the calculation? Similarly, the importance 
of patenting has risen steadily in certain fields of the software industry, 
especially in communication technology (e.g., patents on GSM standard) 
and also in graphical fields; how can this additional form of protection 
be accurately separated from the protection offered by copyright? The 
problems do not reside within the software industry; e.g., one can question 
the relevance of inclusion of database industries as a result of recent 
empirical research that shows that the protection offered by copyright 
may not play an important role in that area of business at all (DG Internal 
Market, 2005). Similarly, it is hard to see what advertising does among core 
copyright industries.10 On the other hand, retail gets typically the biggest 
single share of the “pie” of income from sales of copyrighted works11 and 
thus its location could be challenged 
Interestingly, the classification seems to miss one industry that is both large 
and truly benefiting from copyright, and that is the adult entertainment 
8. For comparison, in 2007, farming, forestry, and fishing were 0.7%, manufacturing, extraction, 
transportation, and crafts 22.9%, managerial, professional, and technical 34.9%, sales and 
office 25%, and other services 16.5% (CIA Factbook).
9. The guide’s proposed methodology aims to solve this problem with surveys to measure the 
importance of copyright, but only for non-core copyright industries Even if the core industries 
were studied with surveys, the author remains sceptical that any useful data could be collected 
because it is very hard for companies to estimate which factors affect their success in the 
markets. 
10. Advertising agencies both use and create copyrighted material, but the actual protection 
offered by copyright is hardly an essential tool against competition since “ad piracy” really does 
not make sense as a concept. 
11. E.g. retal gets on average 25% of the income from CD-sales (Article 5.) 
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industry.12 This is partly understandable since the industry in question 
is illegal in many of WIPO’s member states. However, its economic 
significance appears to be so huge that it should have a notable effect on 
the outcome. Unfortunately there is little dependable data available about 
the size of this industry. On a global scale, it is safe to estimate that we are 
speaking about tens of billions of dollars (more discussion: FPC, 2005). 
In addition, one should be careful about the kinds of conclusions that 
can be drawn from the results. For example, Ruth Towse (2004, p. 79) 
is skeptical that the results would be misappropriated by the copyright 
industries:
… I know no economic doctrine that says “size counts.” Yet that 
is precisely the interference that I know is going to be drawn from 
the date on the copyright-based industries. Indeed, the majority 
of cases, the finance for the research that produces these data 
comes from interested parties who have an established record of 
intentionally or unintentionally misusing the data. They have then 
gone on to persuade policy-makers of the strength of their case for 
increased copyright protection based on two numbers: the growth 
rate of the ‘copyright industries’ and their share in GDP. This is 
what I have called “data for advocacy”… 
Finally, it should be pointed out that the methodology has since been 
adapted in a recent study (Rogers & Szamosszegi, 2007) to count the 
value of industries that rely on copyright exceptions and limitations (i.e., 
fair use) instead of on rights. The outcome is somewhat predictable13 - 
these industries are much larger than the copyright-based industries:
The research indicates that the industries benefiting from fair use 
and other limitations and exceptions make a large and growing 
contribution to the U.S. economy. The fair use economy in 2006 
12. This might also be a wrong conclusion since most of the adult entertainment belongs also to 
other categories, e.g., film. However, the guide is unclear about this question.
13. It fits very well into Towse’s dim view of the real goals of this kind of study, too.
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accounted for $4.5 trillion in revenues and $2.2 billion in value 
added, roughly 16.2 percent of U.S. GDP. It employed more than 
17 million people and supported a payroll of $1.2 trillion. It 
generated $194 billion in exports and rapid productivity growth. 
(Rogers & Szamosszegi, 2007, p. 27)
However, the study should show that a balanced approach to the economic 
models is needed. If only the rights-based side is taken into account, the 
policy suggestions may very well be detrimental to the general welfare of 
society. As the next section will show, there has indeed been lot of work in 
this area among economists.
1.2.2. Economics of IPRs
The author of this study is usually not fond of speaking about Intellectual 
Property Rights (IPRs) in general terms because the copyrights, patents, 
trade secrets, and trademarks share few things in common. Unfortunately, 
since it is more or less a standard approach in the literature, a short 
overview of the economic rationale of IPRs follows.
The logic in this discourse is typically that, first, economic growth is a 
key element for societal development. Similarly, innovation has been seen 
as a main driving force for economic growth. Schumpeter (1942) was 
among the first economists to link economic progress to the contribution 
of creative entrepreneurs. 
In a landmark article, Kenneth J. Arrow gave reasons that perfect 
competition might fail to allocate resources optimally in the case of 
invention and IPRs might be needed:
We expect a free enterprise economy to under invest in invention 
and research (as compared with an ideal), because it is risky, 
because the product can be appropriated only to a limited extent, 
and because of increasing returns in use. This underinvestment will 
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be greater for the more basic research. (Arrow, 1962, p. 15) 
A “logical” conclusion from this basis is quite often that stronger IPRs 
result in more innovation and increased social development. 
This conclusion, however, is not universally accepted; it is used mostly 
in the rhetoric of trade organizations like the Business Software Alliance 
(BSA) and other interest groups close to the IPR owners’ industries. 
Academic research has constantly voiced skepticism over a one-eyed view 
of IPRs and numerous studies have been conducted to get some verifiable 
conclusions. Some economists stress general economic problems associated 
with state intervention, others admit that IPRs may be needed to create 
markets but criticize their ill functioning and non-efficient property rights 
distribution from artists’ perspective (the current rights distribution favors 
the IPR industry). 
Douglas Clements is in the first category of critics and summarizes the recent 
critical economic discussion in his article “Creation Myths” (Clements, 
2003). His conclusion is that the scholars criticizing the current scope of 
IPRs may have a case, the contribution to the public good of innovations 
possibly does not justify the current system because “attendant damages 
of inefficiently high prices, low quantities, and stifled future innovation” 
may outweigh the benefits. 
Boldrin and Levine (2003) take similar, but even stronger position14: 
…allowing the government to grant monopolies is extremely 
dangerous- and we should require clear and compelling evidence 
before doing so. Since theoretical argument is insufficient to 
settle the point, since empirical evidence is almost non-existent, 
14. They explain their position and review very large amount of empirical research in their book 
“Against Intellectual Monopoly”. A  version of the book is available from: http://www.dklevine.
com/general/intellectual/againstfinal.htm.
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and since anecdotal evidence strongly suggests that intellectual 
property reduces rather than encourages innovation, there should 
be a strong presumption against patents and copyrights. It is our 
view that they should be abolished pending strong and persuasive 
evidence that they actually do some good.
Scalise analyzes the question from different angle in his book Intellectual 
Property Protection Reform (1999). He essentially accepts Arrow’s basic 
tenets and goes on to argue that the level of optimal IPRs depends heavily 
on the level of economic development of the country. Obviously, in less-
developed countries the rules should be more flexible and not globally 
uniform in contrast to the main ideals behind IPR harmonization efforts. 
The United States is actually a good example of this; the country has been 
very selective in its choice of protected IPRs. (see e.g., Nowell-Smith, 1968, 
pp. 64-85).
The question whether “one size fits all (countries)” is currently being 
discussed at WIPO as a part of the so-called development agenda process. 
It was also heavily debated during the World Summit for Information 
Society. The main protagonists in this discussion are Brazil and India, 
which see the current system as harming their economic interests. They are 
supported at least partly by the least developing countries and, furthermore, 
by a large and relatively diverse group of nongovernmental organizations 
(see Geneva Declaration, 2004).
The origins of this current debate can be traced back to the process that led 
to the World Trade Organization’s (WTO) TRIPS agreement. That treaty 
introduced strict new rules on IMPs and, most importantly, an effective 
way to ensure compliance through WTO’s general dispute resolution 
process. In other words, if a country does not follow the duties set forth 
in TRIPS, an offended country may seek penalties, which may take the 
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form of trade sanctions.15  The developing countries felt that they were 
strong-armed into accepting the treaty, which disregarded their national 
interests, e.g., health care and education (see Drahos & Braithwaite, 2002 
for more detail about the process; May, 2000 and Maskus, 2000 for more 
general discourse). As a consequence, since then they have sought ways 
to balance the situation with direct effects on negotiations processes in 
various international organizations. 
It should be noted that this discussion is nothing new. A similar process 
has taken place several times before. For example, during the nineteenth 
century, the question of optimal national IPR policy was heavily debated 
by different governments in Europe (see Penrose & Machlup, 1965 for 
more details)
1.2.3. Copyright and Economics
The discussion of economic rationale of copyright is somewhat older than 
copyright itself. The most simplified form of the idea has been the same 
during the last three centuries16: In order to have an economic incentive to 
produce new works, the authors must be protected against direct copying; 
otherwise, they wouldn’t be able to get back the sunken costs of creating 
the work.17 This protection has been given in the form of a temporary 
monopoly that should be balanced against society’s need to disseminate 
works.18 
15. Interestingly, a country may also seek penalties against ”traditional” free trade violations 
and be rewarded with an option to partly disregard the IPRs owned by the companies from the 
offending country. This is basically the only viable option for very small countries like Antigua 
and Barbuda for questioning the politics of countries like the United States.
16. It should be pointed out that this is true only for Western World, the situation is different in 
other cultures (e.g. Alford, 1997).
17. This of course assumes that the sunken costs are higher than the cost occurring to the copyist 
when he starts producing competing copies.
18. This presentation is prone to several corrections that we further elaborate in this chapter.
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Netanel (2008, p. 81) differentiates three separate ways copyright is 
supporting creativity and acting “as an engine for free speech”. The first 
one is “production function”, which is in line with the just mentioned 
justification. Secondly, copyright has also “support function” i.e. it makes 
it possible to for authors and publishers to rely on markets without 
patronage and governmental support (and influence). 19 Thirdly, there is 
also “expressive function”, which bolters the relevant actors societal status 
and thus encourages active participation to public discourse.  However, as 
Netanel points out, there are also reasons to believe that none of these 
functions are generally valid. On the contrary, in many situations the 
actual outcome could be opposite compared to expected outcome.
Watt (2004) offers seven factors that separate it from other tangible 
creations and which should not be forgotten in the economic analysis of 
copyright. They can be summarized as follows:
1. Without copyright, its subject matter would be public good. A 
public good is typically defined in the following way: A good that 
is both nonexcludable and nonrival. A good is nonexcludable if it 
is not possible to prevent anyone from consuming the good once 
it has been made available to the public. A good is nonrival if one 
person’s consumption of that good does not reduce the quantity 
available for consumption by someone else. It should be obvious 
that (non-protected) content fulfils that description easily. If one 
person is playing a song, it does not prevent other persons playing 
the same song. For the composer of that song it is very costly to 
monitor who is using his work at any particular time and even 
harder to prevent others from playing it.
2. The right is typically divided into smaller subcategories. A consumer 
19. For a good overview of different alternative models for copyright, see Liebowics & Watt, 
2006.
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who buys a CD, does not get full copyright to it but instead a 
right to use that copy for his personal purposes. If he wants to use 
the material in a film that he will publish on the Internet, he has 
to acquire a totally different set of rights from the rightholder(s). 
This feature is especially prominent in computer software, which 
is currently typically licensed, not sold as physical media.
3. A copyrighted work normally has to be fixed to a “delivery good” 
(CD, book), which is then sold to the consumer. This physical 
object is subject to normal property rights belonging to tangible 
creations.20 However, in the digital environment the difference 
between delivery good and original work is nonexistent.21 
4. An important factor is the dualistic nature of the term copy itself. 
It may mean a copy of the original “master work” or, alternatively, 
the opposite of an original, i.e., a work made without the consent 
of the copyright holder’s permission.22
5. Another factor is the special nature of the process required to create 
the original work and the copies. The creation of the original work 
typically causes high fixed costs, but from that point the costs 
are miniscule. For example, the production of a Hollywood film 
requires tens or hundreds of millions of dollars. The cost of copying 
the DVD in which that film is stored is less than a dollar, even for 
the physical copy, and even less if the copy is made digitally (i.e., 
to a hard drive). In other words, the marginal cost of producing 
one extra copy approaches zero and consequently the market price 
should follow. This means that it is hard or even impossible to get 
the sunken costs back without some kind of artificial restrictions 
20. Quite naturally, since it is possible to exclude free riders and typically only a limited number 
of consumers can use a certain physical copy at the same time. 
21. However, a technical protection measure may transform a digital copy to a form that shares 
the same features as its physical copy, i.e., only one consumer can use and possess it at the same 
time. 
22. Watt uses the latter meaning in his writings, but in this study the meaning are (hopefully) 
always distinguished by adding “legal” or “unauthorized” in front of the term.
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in the market. In addition, the very low marginal cost makes it 
very profitable to produce unauthorized copies and, often, also 
expensive to police for the copyright holder. This situation is only 
heightened by digital technology.
6. The area has gone through relatively rapid and constant 
technological development during the last century. The inventions 
of radio and TV, LPs, cassette tapes, CDs, DVDs, photocopiers and 
others have all caused severe stress to existing business models and 
regulation. 
7. High transaction costs and externalities plague copyright system. 
Attempting to correct for one externality normally only gives rise 
either to a new externality (faced by the other party), or to further 
transaction costs. (Watt 2004, pp. 153-155)
Another important point is that authors and publishers should not be 
considered as single entities. In many cases their incentives are quite 
separate. Figure 1 offers a (simplified) presentation of possible motivating 
factors. The author has many possible economic incentives for the creation 
of a work. The importance of different factors has varied historically and 
is also based on the field in which the author is working.23 The publisher 
has typically only one source of economic incentive—making a profit from 
sales.24  Another way to look at it is that the creation of the work and the 
distribution of the work are two separate stages that may or may not 
have an economic link. In typical discourse about the economic effects of 
copyright this separation is blurred.
 
23. It should be noted that there are many noneconomic factors. For example, a person who 
is writing a political pamphlet  to market his ideas does not necessarily need any auxiliary 
economic incentives. 
24. As noted, this is a simplified description; e.g., there are also non-commercial publishers that 
have other than purely economic incentives. Advertisements could also be used instead of selling 
the work.
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Figure 1. The different incentives of authors and publishers
Moving on, the rationality of copyright requires that the economic 
incentives cannot be produced in any less expensive ways. As Landes and 
Posner (1989) formulate in their seminal article:
For copyright law to promote economic efficiency, its principal 
legal doctrines must, at least approximately, maximize the benefits 
from creating additional works minus both the losses from limiting 
access and the costs of administrating copyright protection. 
In the early days of copyright economics, a comparison was made between 
existing copyright regime and no copyright at all. Interestingly, in two 
ground-breaking articles this category also included quite extensive 
empirical evidence to support their claims. Plant (1934) analyzed the U.S. 
publishing industry in the 19th century and his conclusions were quite 
negative for copyright:
The conclusions concerning the necessity for copyright which 
emerge from this survey may now be summarised .. In the first 
place, expectation of direct reward explains only a part of the total 
-36-
output of literature, just as it fails to account for more than part 
of the inventions which are made. Secondly, just as professional 
inventors continue to be paid for their services in fields in which 
the patent system does not apply, so also have professional authors 
in modern times been remunerated for their writings, whether by 
payment of a lump sum or by way of royalty on the sale of copies, 
in a country in which they were unprotected by copyright law...
More authors write books because copyright exists, and a greater 
variety of books is published; but there are fewer copies of the 
books which people want to read. (pp. 191-192) 
Breyer (1970) investigated the journal business as part of the process of 
renewal of U.S copyright law. His conclusion about the general benefits of 
copyright for books is rather bleak:
The preceding analysis also indicates that the case for copyright in 
books considered as a whole is weak. It suggests that to abolish 
protection would not produce a very large or a very harmful decline 
in most kinds of book production. And abolition should benefit 
some readers by producing lower prices, eliminating the cost of 
securing permission to copy, and increasing the circulation of the 
vast majority of books that would continue to be produced... In 
sum, it is difficult to do other than take an ambivalent position on 
the question of whether current copyright protection—considered 
as a whole—is justified.25 (Breyer, 1970, p. 132)
Unfortunately, the habit of using real data to check the validity of proposed 
models has since ceased to a large extent. Instead, most published material 
is strictly formal mathematical models whose relevance to the real world 
25. Breyer also makes interesting comments about the legislative process, which could as well 
describe more recent efforts: “The hearings reveal little critical analysis of industry claims that 
protection is needed. They show little awareness of the possible harms of extending protection. 
Rather, the data amassed at the hearings is unsifted, often irrelevent, fact and opinion, and many 
critical facts about affected industries are missing. Of course the hour is late; the revisors have 
long been hard at work. Yet one cannot escape the conclusion that more empirical work and 
more thoughtful analysis is needed before the Copyright Law is significantly revised.”
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can be questioned (e.g., Liebowitz, 2005, p. 5).26 
A quick primer on this theoretical discussion follows. The main cost of 
limiting access is caused by deadweight loss. In theory, the right holder will 
produce too few copies and sell them at too high price, causing a social 
loss. This is typically illustrated in macroeconomics books in a fashion 
similar to Figure 2:
Figure 2 - Deadweight loss of monopoly
26. There are naturally certain exceptions. The question of the effects of unlicensed copying in 
both the real world and P2P networks has attracted quite a bit of empirical research lately (see 
Png, 2006 for a good summary).
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The deadweight loss in the diagram is B + C. Area A is the transfer of 
wealth from consumers to the right holder. The situation is somewhat 
worse if we are speaking about fully digital products since the marginal 
cost of producing extra units approaches zero after the first unit (y*) 
moves toward the intersection of demand and the x-axis.
However, it is rare that the right holder is really in a position to charge the 
full monopoly price i.e. has a full market power. There are several reasons 
for this. First, in many cases other products exist in the market that are at 
least partial substitutes. For example, Adobe Photoshop is competing with 
commercial products like CorelDraw, shareware products like Paintshop 
Pro and open source products like GIMP. Arguably, none of these offer the 
same value proposition as Photoshop but they still limit Adobe’s pricing 
choices. 
Another source of competition comes from unauthorized copying. The 
higher the cost of the original, the more attractive it is to get a copy from a 
black market source (or from a P2P system of choice). Of course, the right 
holder aims to limit this copying by using the enforcement tools but this 
also causes costs to him and therefore optimization goes multidimensional. 
This question has been studied quite intensively in the literature (e.g. Oz, 
2001, pp. 65-77; Handke, 2006, Posner, 2005 pp. 62-63). The general 
conclusion is that unauthorized copying may have positive welfare effects 
for society and in certain specific cases even to the right holder (see Watt, 
2000, pp. 33-37).
Watt (2004) also heavily criticizes the use of statistics of unauthorized 
copying done by the trade associations. In these reports the number of 
unauthorized copies is typically multiplied by the market price and the 
result is a loss to the industry. In the case of BSA’s (2006) piracy study, they 
argue that actual loss is even larger than lost sales because of the loss of 
addition services, etc. Watt points out that
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- At most that is the loss of revenue, not loss of profit since the cost 
of producing and distributing the copies does not occur
- Not all copies are lost sales—there are few useful empirical data 
available but in the case of the record industry, the actual substitution is in 
the range of 25-40%
- The price of works would rise without competition from 
unauthorized copying and that would reduce consumer surplus and overall 
social welfare
- Unauthorized copying adds to the social welfare of consumers 
since it allows the consumption of goods at lower prices
- The often cited loss of jobs may not occur—the jobs just change 
places, from the developed world to those countries in which the 
unauthorized copies are made. 
- Even if the unauthorized copying is harmful, its effects are hard to 
estimate without knowing the exact money flows of a particular industry. 
If the loss is equally shared with the artists in a certain area, unauthorized 
copying hits the marginal artists the hardest, but they might be better off 
anyway doing something else. On the other hand, if the damage is caused 
mostly to superstars, the effect is small because those persons are likely to 
have very low marginal utility of money.
The recent literature also takes some other questions into account. For 
example, Liebowitz (2002) argues that in those cases where “indirect 
appropriability”27 is possible, the harms of unauthorized copying can be 
ameliorated. He also depicts three other situations in which unauthorized 
copying may not be harmful for the owner of the copyright. The first 
obvious one is a person who would not have purchased the product 
even if copying had been impossible. Another is “exposure effect.” The 
copyright holder actually sells more because the unauthorized copies work 
27  The term basically means a situation in which the price of the work can be higher for 
copies that will be used for unauthorized copying. 
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as free advertising for his other works or services. The third case is strong 
network externalities. A typical example of this could be office software, 
where the value of the software rises for all users if more people are locked 
into its file formats; that is, they need the software to exchange documents 
(Liebowitz, 2002, p. 149). 
Another example could again be Adobe Photoshop: after a person learns 
to use it, he or she is less willing to use an alternative since that would 
mean investing time in learning. In this case the value of other products 
effectively goes down.
However, Liebowitz does not support the idea that these cases are the 
norm. Instead, he argues that the economic interests of a copyright holder 
are in most cases harmed by unauthorized copying. He also indicates that 
his earlier points are being stretched too much by other economists:
It currently appears to be the case that for a majority of economics 
papers on the subject (though this claim is rather casual since I 
have not done a count of these papers), pirating is treated as an 
activity that should be embraced by the party being pirated, if 
they are farsighted and enlightened enough. Theoretical models 
now abound in the literature ‘demonstrating’ all the ways that the 
producer of a product might benefit from piracy. Economic articles 
on this subject would seem to imply that it is almost always a 
terrific idea to have third parties providing free copies of your 
product. And these articles generally conclude that society would 
almost always be better off in such a situation.  (Liebowitz, 2005, 
p. 5)
Other problems also exist with the current standard approach used in 
economics. For example, Ruth Towse lists the following “sins” that are 
common in theoretical articles:
- Ignoring moral rights;
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- Ignoring the difference between copyright and the neighbouring 
rights;
- Ignoring the distributional effects of copyright;
- Making the assumption that artists and publishers, sound 
recording makers, broadcasters and all the other businesses share 
the same common goals. (Towse 2006, p. 568)
Towse argues that these factors are taken into account more in cultural 
economics, which is an application of standard economics to cultural 
phenomena with a wider perspective than pure IPR-based modeling. For 
example, government grants and labor are factors that often have much 
more profound effects on the earnings of artists than copyright-based 
income. 
Finally, it should be kept in mind that the economic analysis of copyright 
law has real life effects outside the academic circles. Especially the courts 
in the United States routinely rely on economic theories and thus getting 
good briefs from economists is essential for the parties. For example in 
Eldred v. Ashcroft seventeen leading professors of the field28 wrote against 
the rationality of the copyright extension. However, even if the majority 
Supreme Court did not disagree, it still concluded that: 
In sum, we find that the CTEA is a rational enactment; we are not 
at liberty to second-guess congressional determinations and policy 
judgments of this order, however debatable or arguably unwise 
they may be.
In addition, certain judges are very prone to the use of economics in their 
argumentation. Judge Richard Posner is perhaps the well-known person 
28. George A. Akerlof, Kenneth J. Arrow, Timothy F. Bresnahan, James M. Buchanan, Ronald H. 
Coase, Linda R. Cohen, Milton Friedman, Jerry R. Green, Robert W. Hahn, Thomas W. Hazlett, 
C. Scott Hemphill, Robert E. Litan, Roger G. Noll, Richard Schmalensee, Steven Shavell, Hal R. 
Varian, and Richard J. Zeckhauser. There’s five Nobel Prize winners in the group.
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in this sense. Below is an illustrating example from Ty, Inc v. Publications 
International Ltd29:
Granted, there is some question how, if Beanie Babies collectors’ 
guides are indeed a complement to Beanie Babies (and they are), 
and Ty has a monopoly of Beanie Babies (and it does), Ty can get 
a second monopoly profit by taking over the guides market. The 
higher the price it charges for guides, the lower will be the demand 
for such guides and hence for collecting Beanie Babies and so 
the less effective will Ty’s strategy of marketing Beanie Babies as 
collectibles be. This is the sort of question that has engendered 
skepticism among economists about the antitrust rule against tie-
in agreements. But there is an answer here: Ty wants to suppress 
criticism of its product in these guides.
29. The question in the case was is it legal to use actual photos of Beania Babies in Beanie Babies 
Collector’s Guide.
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2. Research Questions and Methods
2.1.  Research Questions
There used to be a time when it was possible to write a comprehensive 
study of copyright. Today, that would be utterly impossible. It would also 
be a waste of resources since there is already a lot of existing, good quality 
research. For a person with a passion for basically all aspects of copyright, 
setting a clear focus is thus one of the hardest tasks.  There are so many 
interesting details, dark alleys of knowledge and unknowns, that have to 
be discarded in the name of clarity, that it is purely painful. Because this 
dissertation is based on five articles that were written during a relative 
long period of time, the focus still remains quite wide.
As explained at the beginning of this chapter, the main goal of this 
dissertation is to determine whether copyright has a future. To answer this 
question, the work seeks to address the following three questions:
- Do technical protection measures (TPMs) help to solve the 
impending demise of copyright?
- Is the legal enforcement of copyright possible in current or future 
digital environments?
- What is the role of social norms in the future of copyright?
The reason for these three questions is the following. First, the (once) 
prevailing vision of copyright in the digital environment was based on the 
idea that without technological protection measures right holders would 
not release their content to digital distribution. Because the TPMs would 
be broken sooner or later, they should also be protected legally to prevent 
users from benefiting from the inevitable circumvention. The first questions 
aims to answer the question of how correct this vision has been.
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The second question is also quite profound. If a right cannot be enforced, 
it ceases to exist in practice. In other words, if the copyright holders cannot 
prevent most of unlicensed use of their works (e.g,, copying or making 
available to public), the economic rationale of copyright disappears.  
 
The final question continues from the point where enforcement stops. 
Even if legal enforcement of a right is not feasible, it is still possible that 
the people might follow the rule anyway. The dissertation asks this might 
be the case with copyright. 
 
2.1.1. Terminology
The discourse about copyright and other rights aiming to foster innovation 
is filled with politically loaded words and phrases. This rhetorical fight, 
which has been going on longer than copyright has actually even existed, 
makes it hard to write neutral and at the same time exact scientific text. 
In some cases an author has no other option but to choose between two 
equally loaded terms. That choice positions the author on a certain side of 
the trenches in the reader’s mind. A classic example is the choice between 
the terms “users’ rights” and “copyright restrictions.” Another term, 
which immediately classifies the author, is “theft” if applied to the act of 
unauthorized copying. After the stigma has been established, it makes it 
hard to convey any information to people on the other side.
Certain copyright scholars, especially Neil Netanel (2006) and Peter Jaszi 
(1996) have even argued that the choice of language has partly dictated 
-45-
the path of development in copyright.30 One has to admit that the 
proponents of stronger copyright have been able to create very persuasive 
“memes”31 starting from use of the term “pirate,” which was first used 
back in the era when actual pirates still roamed the open seas. This is not 
surprising considering that creative talents have mostly been on their side. 
Some other more memorable examples include the use of environmental 
terminology during the 1970s:
. . . the unprecedented technological progress [in photocopying] of 
the last decade harms the environment the same way DDT affects 
wildlife, and if the condition is permitted to continue it may go 
well beyond the point of no return. (Narsi, 1976, p. 14)
The late Jack Valenti’s (1982) much quoted testimony on VCR’s derivative 
effects:
I say to you that the VCR is to the American film producer and 
the American public as the Boston Strangler is to the woman home 
alone.
 Valenti’s more recent comparison between P2P and  the so-called global 
war on terror: 
30  “The rhetoric and economic theory of real property are increasingly dominating the 
discourse and conclusions of the very different world of intellectual property.  The shift begins 
with simple rhetoric--talking about intellectual property rights as aspects of a broader system 
of property.  But its implications go far beyond that.  The temptation to move from rhetoric to 
rationale seems almost irresistible.  Courts and commentators adopt--explicitly or implicitly--
the economic logic of real property in the context of intellectual property cases.  They then make 
a subconscious move, one that the economic theory of property does not justify: they jump from 
the idea that intellectual property is property to the idea that the IP owner is entitled to capture 
the full social value of her right.  This leads them to an almost obsessive preoccupation with 
identifying and rooting out that great evil of the modern economic world--free riding.” (Lemley, 
2005)
31  Meme can be defined as “a cultural unit (an idea or value or pattern of behavior) that 
is passed from one generation to another by non-genetic means (as by imitation); memes are the 
cultural counterpart of genes” (wordnet.princeton.edu/perl/webwn).
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We’re fighting our own terrorist war…the great moat that protects 
us, and it is only temporary, is lack of broadband access. (Harmon 
2002)
Finally, EMI executive J. F. Cecillon’s “instant classic” from Creativity.
Online.fi-event:
Public domain means pillage, rape and murder.
This kind of hyperbole makes rational discourse often hard and may 
easily lead to strong polarization of the different actors (Logie, 2003). In 
particular, Professor Lawrence Lessig has been advocating a more neutral 
approach32 (e.g., Lessig, 2003b) but his message has not gained much 
popularity.
However, an undeniable fact is that the author of this dissertation stands 
firmly with the user-right side in the academic field. Therefore, it should 
come as no surprise that this dissertation prefers certain pro-users’ 
right terms and avoids other terms that the author feels carry too much 
suggestive weight. However, in one place the author has given in: The 
term “intellectual property rights” has been used instead of a term that 
was used before IPR but that is already unfortunately mostly forgotten:33 
“intellectual monopoly privileges” (IMPs); hopefully, one day, somebody 
braver will revitalize use of this term.
2.1.2. Digital Rights Management / 
Technical Protection Measures
The terms Digital Rights Management (DRM) and Technical Protection 
32. This has been one of the key selling arguments for Creative Commons, which uses the slogan 
“some rights reserved.”
33. The change of terminology did not happen by accident. Instead, it was a deliberate project 
done by French patent proponents (Penrose & Machlup, 1950).
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Measures (TPMs) are used widely in this work.34 These terms are often 
used as synonyms, but it is also possible to define them separately. For 
example, Still (2007) believes that any digital description of rights means 
DRM. In other words, DRM would mean not only “traditional” copy 
protection systems (upper right corner in figure 3) but also right description 
languages like XrML and traditional end user license agreements (lower 
right corner). In addition, open licensing models like Creative Commons 
and Open Source would belong to the scope of DRM (lower left corner). 
 
Figure 3. 2 x 2 table of different aspects of  rights description and 
management
34.  It should be pointed out that Richard Stallman and the Free Software Movement oppose 
both terms. For example, they call DRM “Digital Restriction Management.”
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The author of this dissertation disagrees with this approach. Expanding 
the meaning this wide just muddies the discourse and makes precise 
arguments basically impossible. Instead, it would be better to use some 
term for this all-inclusive licensing and management and keep DRM for 
systems that belong to the group in the upper right corner of figure 3. A 
definition of that group could be written as follows:
(a) A technical system used to secure and distribute protected 
media files. The rights are typically defined during the protection 
step and issued as a usage license to consumers; or (b) A system 
used to control access to an online service.
However, as the reader will notice, the term “Technical Protection 
Measures” is introduced and used in Article II instead of DRM. The main 
reason is that TPM is less likely to cause confusion. In addition, it is also 
used nowadays almost exclusively in European copyright regulation and 
discourse.  This is also the reason the term is used in this chapter.
2.2. Research Methodology
The author of this study believes strongly that no single approach can 
give comprehensive answers for any questions pertaining to copyright. 
In particular, the classical normative legal approach—while very useful 
in certain circumstances—is currently not a powerful enough tool to give 
much new understanding to the questions at hand. 
The author therefore finds it quite refreshing that the most recent 
Finnish doctoral theses pertaining to copyright have used mostly other 
methodologies than the classical normative approach. Pitkänen (2005) uses 
a wide combination of different methodologies, including a scenario-based 
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approach, and Välimäki’s (2005) dissertation is also multidisciplinary, i.e., 
his methods include history, economics, and law. Huuskonen (2006) uses 
a similar approach, e.g., law and economics combined with historical 
analysis. Turunen (2005) uses (apparently) communication theory. Virtanen 
(2005) mixes law and technology, and law and economics, in a normative 
approach. Leppämäki’s (2006) approach is based on law and philosophy. 
Still’s work (2007) is a combination of law and technology35 and a 
normative approach with a strong “De Lege Ferenda” section. Perhaps 
the boldest work is that of Kimppa (2007), who uses normative ethics, 
philosophy, and computer science to question the whole existence of IPRs. 
The biggest exceptions are Kontkanen’s (2006) and Sorvari’s dissertations 
(2005), which are good examples of a very traditional normative approach, 
including its strong points—and some weaknesses.
This study’s multidisciplinary approach is closest to the approaches of 
Välimäki and Huuskonen. However, the dissertation uses an even wider 
scale of diverse methodologies, listed in table 4. A more detailed discussion 
of the different methodologies can be found in the relevant articles and is 
not repeated here.
Article Methodologies used Research 
questions
1. Transnational Advocacy Net-
work Opposing DRM: Technical 
and Legal Challenge to Media 
Companies
Transnational Advo-
cacy Network Theory, 
descriptive.
Question 1
2. DRM Interoperability and 
Intellectual Property Policy in 
Europe
Normative Approach, 
De Lege Ferenda
Question 1
35. She describes her method as an “information law approach” (oikeusinformatiikka).
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3. Theory of Deterrence and In-
dividual Behaviour: Can Law-
suits Control File Sharing on the 
Internet?
Historical, Law and 
Economics, Behavioral 
Law and Economics
Question 2
4. Free Software and Copyright 
Enforcement: A Tool for Global 
Copyright Policy?
International Political 
Economics
Question 3
5. Copyright Levies as an Alterna-
tive Compensation Method for 
Recording Artists and Techno-
logical Development
Normative Approach, 
Law and Economics, 
Law and Technology
Question 2
Table 4.  Methodologies
A large part of the source material for this study comes from Anglo-
American tradition.  The reason for this is that first U.K and now the 
United States are leading the development of both copyright legislation 
and information technology. Furthermore, scholars in the United States are 
using much more law and economics as their standard approach, which 
means that there is simply more material produced. In addition, the author 
would argue that the leading scholars in the field are currently based mostly 
in the United States, with certain small but important exceptions.36
It is a common suggestion among more traditional circles of Finnish legal 
scholars that material from the United States should not really be used in 
Finland. That would make more sense in a normative approach because 
of differences in the legal cultures. However, in the areas of law and 
economics and law and technology, the field is more unified. Naturally the 
differences in legal cultures have to be understood; i.e., blind acceptance 
of foreign “legal memes” is never a good idea. Still, the argument that uses 
economics efficiency as one of the key principles of good regulation is a 
nearly perfect fit for copyright, which is supposed to be first and foremost, 
36. For example, Bernt Hugenholz and his research unit do leading edge research on questions 
pertaining to EU copyright legislation
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a tool for maximizing social welfare. 
2.2.1. Behavioral Law and Economics
One of the more interesting areas in the field of law and economics is its 
behavioral form. In this dissertation it is covered extensively in Article 3. 
Because this methodology is generally not well known, a brief introduction 
to its basics is appropriate. The basic notion of behavioral law and 
economics can be described in the following way:
The task of behavioral law and economics, simply stated, is to 
explore the implications of actual (not hypothesized) human 
behavior for the law. How do “real people”  differ from Homo 
economicus. (Jolls, Sunstein & Thaler, 2000).
The difference is that people have only bounded mental capabilities. 
To be exact, behavioral law and economics differentiates three kinds of 
“bounds”:
•	 Bounded rationality;
•	 Bounded willpower; and
•	 Bounded self-interest  (Jolls et al., 2000, p. 14)
Bounded rationality is caused by the limitations of our brains. We don’t 
have perfect memory and we can’t make instant perfect calculations 
or estimations for any truly complicated questions. To overcome these 
problems, we have learned to use different strategies like mental shortcuts 
and rules of thumbs. These are predictable but the outcomes often differ 
from the outcome predicted by rational choice theory (Jolls et al., 2000, 
pp. 14-15).
Bounded willpower deals with the fact that people are often ready to 
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knowingly sacrifice their long-term interests in order to get short-term 
gratification. A typical example could be a large chocolate bar—a person 
may eat it at once even if she knows that she’ll feel ill afterwards both 
mentally and physically.  Often, people also recognize their limitations and 
take actions to mitigate the problem. For example, a person may choose 
not to get a credit card to avoid unnecessary spending. These actions may 
consequently have effects on demand of supply. (Jolls et al., 2000, p. 15)
Bounded self-interest is closely related to the notion of altruism. However, 
in behavioral law and economics it is understood more widely and in 
particular also includes actions that are totally spiteful. A very simple but 
powerful example is the so-called ultimatum game:
In this game, one player, the Proposer, is asked to propose an 
allocation of a sum between herself and the other player, the 
Responder. The Responder then has a choice. He can either accept 
the amount offered to him by the Proposer, leaving the rest  to 
the Proposer, or he can reject the offer, in which case both players 
get nothing. Neither player knows the identity of his or her 
counterpart, and the players will play against each other only once, 
so reputations and future retaliation are eliminated as factors. 
(Jolls et al., 2000, p. 21)
Standard economic theory would suggest that the Proposer should 
recognize that the Pareto optimal solution for her is to give the smallest 
possible amount to the Responder. However, in empirical tests this has 
been proven unrealistic. Instead, Responders typically reject any offers of 
less than 20% of money in the game. The Proposers seem to anticipate this 
and typically propose a substantial share, i.e., ordinarily 40–50% (Jolls, 
et al., 2000, p. 22)
Behavioral law and economics has been able to identify certain common 
biases and heuristics that are typical for most people. These are  summarized 
in tables 5 and 6.
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Bias Description
Extremeness 
Aversion
When choosing between different options, people have a 
strong tendency to avoid extremes. For example, in a restau-
rant, people tend to order dishes that are in the middle of the 
price range.  In empirical tests it has been shown that adding 
a third option (upper or lower end) changes the outcome sig-
nificantly even if nobody chooses that option. 
Hindsight Bias People tend to think that things they know that have already 
happened, happened inevitably. 
Optimis-
tic Bias
People think that bad things happen only to other people, not 
to themselves. Even if they factually know a likelihood, they 
don’t recognize it in their actions in practice.
Status Quo 
Bias
People prefer status quo over change. If the reference point 
is changed, the outcome of the same experiment can be com-
pletely different. For example, a change is accepted much 
more easily if it can be framed as a way to restore earlier 
status quo. For example, an environmental law is accepted 
more easily if it “restores air quality to its earlier stage” than 
if it is said to “improve the quality of air.”
Table 5. Different biases (Sunstein, 2000, pp. 3-4)
Heuristics are tools used to get shortcuts to solutions to mental 
problems. 
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Heuristics Description
Availability People believe that risks are more severe “when an incident is 
readily called to mind or ‘available’.” For example, terrorist 
attacks could be perceived to be much more likely than house 
fires in relative terms. This is important, for example, from an 
enforcement perspective; i.e., highly visible enforcement makes 
people overestimate their likelihood of getting punished. 
Anchoring People make probability judgments by first coining an anchor 
value to which they then try to make adjustments. A typical 
example is jury awards. A juror first guesses what could be a 
standard award and then makes small adjustments based on 
the facts of the case. 
Case -based 
Decisions
It’s often hard to calculate expected costs and benefits for dif-
ferent offered alternatives. Thus, if possible, people will use 
their earlier experiences as a guide, i.e., look for earlier cases 
and reason from them to the current case.
Table 6. Different heuristics (Sunstein, 2000, p. 5)
Behavioral law and economics can also be directly applied to public choice 
theory, which will be described in more detail in the next section. Decision 
makers are merely humans, with similar bounded rationality, willpower, 
and self-interest as the rest of us. Similarly, bureaucrats use the same 
heuristics in their decisions as “normal people.” 
As an example of these processes, many efforts to prevent further terrorist 
attacks after 9/11 presumed that terrorists would be likely to use the exact 
same methods. This is a clear case of availability heuristics; the likelihood 
that a similar attack will succeed is basically very close to zero because 
fellow passengers will now try to kill anyone who tries to hijack a plane with 
box-cutters or similar relatively benign weapons. Still, completely obtuse, 
-55-
tight rules were set to prevent sharp objects from entering planes.37
Behavioral law and economics has also faced some criticism. For example, 
Richard Posner is highly skeptical whether behavioral law and economics 
has anything positive to add to law and economics. His strongest criticism 
is aimed at bounded rationality:
One might have thought that behavioral economics had at least one 
clear normative implication: that efforts should be made through 
education and perhaps psychiatry to cure the cognitive quirks and 
weakness of will that prevent people from acting rationally with 
no offsetting gains. Even if as I believe the sunk-costs fallacy has 
biological roots, it should not be impossible to educate people out 
of it. Behavioral therapy has enabled many people to overcome 
their fear of flying, which I suspect has more tenacious biological 
roots…All their suggestions for legal reform are of devices for 
getting around, rather than dispelling, our irrational tendencies—
which, fortunately, they exaggerate. (Posner 1999)
The author of this study believes that Posner is underestimating the 
biological roots of bounded rationality. It has been proven that even if test 
subjects know beforehand the likely mistake they are about make, they are 
still very prone to make it. Thus education is not the solution but instead 
getting better information about a phenomenon and drawing consequent 
relevant and practical conclusions. 
Another stinging criticism is offered by Mitchell (2002):
…Behavioral law and economics bases its model of bounded 
rationality on a very limited set of empirical data and draws 
unsupportable conclusions about human nature from this partial 
37. For example, there are several reports that pilots were prevented from taking nail-cutters 
onto the plane. It is hard to see how this can be an effective measure against hijacking even if we 
forget the fact that pilots typically have axes and other powerful equipment in their possession 
inside the cockpit and, more importantly, full control of the plane itself. For more general 
discussion, see Mueller (2006).
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data set. Behavioral law and economics scholars simplify and 
overgeneralize findings on human cognition and rationality to 
make these findings seem simultaneously important and simple 
enough to be incorporated into legal policy. Remarkably, despite 
the amazing breadth and boldness of many of the empirical claims 
made by advocates of behavioral law and economics, the validity 
of these empirical claims has largely gone untested within the legal 
academy. 
These arguments are harder to debut as large part of behavioral law and 
economics is indeed based on test made in “laboratory” environments 
instead of using real empirical data. However, that is something that could 
be solved by doing more research. In addition, as the general knowledge 
about the inner workings of human brains improves, it will inevitably 
sharpen the understanding the limitations and their applicability further.  
2.2.2. Methodology for Further Research: 
Public Choice Theory
If there is one thing the author of this dissertation regrets, it is not using 
more public choice theory to analyze the legislative processes pertaining to 
current copyright regulation. For example, Article 3. would have benefitted 
most likely from additional analysis from this perspective. However, 
as explained earlier, it is just not possible to do everything at once. In 
hopes of fostering further research, this section about this little-known 
methodology (at least in Finland) is included here. 
The term public choice theory is a bit misguiding, because there is no 
single theory but, rather, a wide range of approaches that aim to use 
different tools from economics to model the decision-making of public 
bodies. The strongest common factor between the approaches is that the 
different actors (politicians, bureaucrats, voters, lobbyists, etc.) are seen as 
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rational Homo economicus who aim to maximize their own welfare. As 
a consequence, governmental decision-making is as prone to failures as 
markets are. 
Indeed, one of the motivating factors for the theory has been a deep 
skepticism toward governmental decision-making. It has been seen as a 
counter force for the Keynesian approach, which prefers governmental 
interventions for solving problems. (Shawn, 2002)
James Buchanan describes the theory more modestly:
It is nothing more than common sense, as opposed to romance. To 
some extent, people then and now think about politics romantically. 
Our systematic way of looking at politics is nothing more than 
common sense. (The Region, 1995).
The history of public choice can be traced back to two seminal works, 
Buchanan and Tullock’s The Calculus of Consent 38 and Olson’s Logic of 
Collective Action.39 The theory has since been expanded to all different 
aspects of public decision-making. For example, its premises have been 
used to explain the strategies of dictators, monetary policy, optimal forms 
of EU governing structure, and even the nature of public school music 
38. Buchanan has a fascinating explanation for where he got the ideas for his work: “I spent a 
year in Italy (1955-56). It changed my perspective on politics because I think a lot of Americans, 
of my generation anyway, still had a romantic view of politics. Italians, for me at least, served 
the function of introducing a lot of skepticism, a lot more questions. Had I not spent that year 
in Italy, I might not have ever really been able to come to the critical realistic view of politics as 
I did” (The Region, 1995).
39. In the beginning the approach was known as “Study of Non-Market Decision Making,” but 
it was soon  renamed to the more general “Public Choice.” Buchanan does not particularly like 
the name: “Then we had a meeting in Chicago in 1967. At that time we sat around and nobody 
was happy with the title. We needed a name. Somebody came up with Public Choice, which 
really doesn’t fit very well descriptively because a lot of people think of it as a public opinion 
polling thing. We get questions about that. But at least it caught on” (Ibid.).
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(Langbein, 2004). Its success culminated in 1986 when Buchanan received 
the Nobel Prize in economics. 
Felkins differentiates public choice into five subcategories:
•	 Constitutional, Democratic Government
•	 Voting
•	 Political Manipulations
•	 Rent Seeking
•	 The Realities of Collectives
In the first three categories the main focus is on the structure of political 
decision-making. The first category deals with the high-level setup of the 
government and often has a strong normative motivation. For example, 
Buchanan has been arguing for constitutional amendments that would 
forbid or sanction a deficient budget, to counter the natural proclivity of 
democracies toward deficits. The work done by bureaucrats belongs in 
this category (e.g. Niskanen’s classical article “The Peculiar Economics of 
Bureaucrazy”, 1968). Lemieux summarizes the topic:
Bureaucrats are assumed to maximize the size of their bureaus’ 
budgets because they can thereby increase their real remuneration 
in terms of perks (larger offices, better expense accounts, etc.), 
lower risk of missing their objectives, recognition, etc. Thus, the 
bureaucrats will produce more than the politicians (and, presumably, 
the citizens) want, or at a higher cost. (Lemieux, 2004)
The second category consists of different studies that try to explain the 
behavior of citizens in different votes. Voting is generally a hard nut to 
crack for economics since it carries the assumption that no rational voter 
would vote, as the likelihood that the outcome depends on his or her 
single vote is basically nil. Much work has been done to overcome this 
paradox.  
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Political manipulations deal with questions like vote transfers, wealth 
transfers, interactions with constituencies, and “log rolling,” Shawn (2002) 
explains log rolling with the following example:
An urban legislator votes to subsidize a rural water project in order 
to win another legislator’s vote for a city housing subsidy. The 
two projects may be part of a single spending bill. Through such 
log rolling both legislators get what they want. And even though 
neither project uses resources efficiently, local voters know that 
their representative got something for them. They may not know 
that they are paying a pro-rata share of a bundle of inefficient 
projects! And the total expenditures may well be more than 
individual taxpayers would be willing to authorize if they were 
fully aware of what is going on. 
Rent seeking is perhaps the most interesting area of research for this study. 
The origins of the theory were laid during the early seventies while the 
economists started to model the interaction between private actors and 
bureaucrats and also, the problems with the governing of the developing 
countries (e.g. Krueger, 1973). A more recent definition from Gunning 
(2003) defines it as follows:
Rent seeking consists of legitimate, non-voting actions that are 
intended to change laws or administration of laws such that one 
individual and/or group gains at the same or greater expense to 
another individual or group. 
In other words, rent seeking consists mostly of different legal ways of 
lobbying. It is seen as detrimental to the health of the society since the 
political system has few defenses against this kind of non-market profit 
making. In addition, the race for the rents seems to be often economically 
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wasteful for both participants and general welfare. (e.g. Tullock, 1981).
Rent seeking is close to the problem of collective action. At first glance 
it would seem that different interests should balance each other out in 
the political process. If interest group A is lobbying for something that 
will cause costs for group B, it would be in the interest of group B to 
commence to counter-lobbying. However, this is the case only if the groups 
share similar internal structure and resources (e.g., two industry lobbying 
organizations). 
Olson’s work (1965) laid the foundation for research on collective (non-) 
action. His basic argument was that even if counter-lobbying made sense 
for individual members of a group, free-riding and costs of monitoring 
often make it an impossible choice as it would be more expensive than just 
accepting the loss without taking any action. 
Later research has sought to determine why this has not always been 
the case. For example, environmental lobbying groups have been able to 
overcome this problem and fight effectively against industry lobbyists in 
certain cases, such as Vuotos-dam in Finland. Similarly, anti-software patent 
activists were able to beat industry lobbyists as the matter was decided 
in European Parliament. It seems that the primary way to overcome the 
problem is to create institutional structures that either make determining 
and punishing free-riding easy or alternatively offer other incentives for 
participation. Olson’s very traditional example of this is insurance offered 
to farmers by their union. A more current example could be the automatic 
monthly payment systems used by NGOs like Amnesty International and 
Greenpeace that lower the transaction costs for participation and thus 
make it easier for consumers to stay involved.
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Copyright legislation is often used a prime example of public rent seeking. 
Posner  (2005, pp 72-72) expands the view to the IPRs in general:
Perhaps most important from a public choice perspective in 
explaining the expansion of intellectual property rights is the 
asymmetry of interests between owners of such rights and would-
be copiers. Since the owners’ principal costs are sunk, almost all the 
revenue from their sale of copies goes directly to the bottom line, 
giving them a very large stake in extending their rights. In contrast, 
would-be copiers, since they will not have exclusive rights once a 
work is pitched into the Intellectual Property: public domain, can 
expect only a competitive return, and so they have less incentive 
to challenge intellectual property rights in the legislature than 
the owners of such rights have to defend them. This asymmetry 
of interests is probably the reason for the practice of extending 
copyright and patent terms retroactively, despite the fact that 
such extensions offer almost no incentive for creating additional 
intellectual property.
Indeed, the documented experiences from the regulative processes in the 
U.S. support strongly this view. For example, Disney funded much of the 
lobbying for Sonny Bono Copyright Act, which extended copyright from 
50 years to 70 years. Littman (2001) basically shows that in practice the 
whole legislative process has actually been “outsourced” to stakeholders. 
The political actors don’t want to act before the major players have reached 
some kind of compromise and if this is not possible, let the courts to try to 
solve the situation.40 The problem for the public has been that they were 
not considered to be a stakeholder and thus nobody is looking after their 
interests in the negotiations.41 
McGowan (2006) has interesting criticism on this “standard” approach. 
He argues that since the goal of the copyright system is maximize general 
40. See Lardner, 1987 for very entertaining description how the fight on legality of Video 
Recorders took place in Congress. 
41. The situation has slightly changed lately due to the fact that the major consumer groups (like 
BEUC) have taken copyright on their agenda. 
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welfare and not consumer welfare as such, the interests of the content 
industry may well work as an adequate proxy for optimal regulation 
strategy. Thus, even if this causes transfers of income from consumers to 
right holders that is not a problem as long as the general welfare grows.  
Another type of criticism comes from Kapczynski (2008).42 She argues 
that public choice theory cannot explain the recent developments in IPRs 
i.e. the considerably stronger consumer resistance against the expansion of 
rights in both international and domestic levels. Instead, she suggests that 
“frame mobilization” might offer better way to systematize and explain the 
current situation. The discipline “investigates how social actors engage the 
field of ideas to theorize their interests, build alliances, mobilize support, 
and discredit their opponents.”  
The author of this dissertation partly agree with Kapczynski. As explained 
in the Article 1. and 4., framing is very central variable in IPR-related 
questions. However, the author also believes that public choice theory 
should not be counted out so fast – it offers very valuable insights to 
mechanics of copyright regulation especially combined with behavioral 
law and economics. An interesting test case could be a study on Finnish 
copyright regulation to see which of the theories predicts the outcomes 
more precisely. 
42. The article contains also excellent references to the general framework of different research 
paradigms (e.g. Rational Choice Theory) on the area. She also refers to Keck & Sikkink 
(1998).
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3. Summary of the Articles
The original articles are arranged in this dissertation such that the “red 
line of the story” is as visible as possible. Therefore the author has not 
used the normal notion of chronological order. We start the discussion 
of Digital Rights management with articles 1 and 2. The remaining three 
articles tackle the question of enforcement from different angles. The last 
article, however, focuses mostly on the future of copyright and alternatives 
for current systems.
Article DRM Enforcement Music/Movies Software
Transnational Advoca-
cy Network Opposing 
DRM: Technical and 
Legal Challenge to Me-
dia Companies
Yes Yes Yes No
DRM Interoperability 
and Intellectual Prop-
erty Policy in Europe
Yes No Yes Yes
Theory of Deterrence 
and Individual Behav-
iour: Can Lawsuits 
Control File Sharing on 
the Internet?
No Yes Yes No
Free Software and 
Copyright Enforce-
ment: A Tool for Global 
Copyright Policy?
No Yes No Yes
Copyright Levies as an 
Alternative Compensa-
tion Method for Record-
ing Artists and Techno-
logical Development
No Yes No No
Table 7.  Summary of covered topics. 
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3.1. Article 1. Transnational Advocacy Network Opposing DRM: 
Technical and Legal Challenge to Media Companies
3.1.1. The Main Content of the Article
The goal of the first article is to create a formal framework for analyzing 
the forces that oppose digital rights management. In addition, the article 
investigates how successful these groups have been in their actions and 
under what conditions.  The basic premise of the article is that the anti-
DRM forces are similar to other loosely connected advocacy networks that 
share a common goal. Earlier examples of this kind of network are human 
rights advocacy networks in Latin America, environmental advocacy 
networks, and networks working against violence against women. As 
can be seen in figure 4, we categorized the participants of transnational 
advocacy network into six classes:
1. Non-governmental organizations like the Electronic Frontier 
Foundation or Free Software Foundation;
2. IT-oriented media like Slashdot;
3. Hackers, i.e., persons who break DRMs;
4. Academics, i.e., persons who do research on either DRMs or 
copyright law;
5. Corporations, i.e., commercial entities that would benefit from the 
demise of DRMs; 
6. Real grassroots activists.
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Figure 4. The transnational advocacy network against DRM (Oksanen & 
Välimäki, 2002, p. 157)
The article then describes how the different actors work. In the case of the 
anti-globalization movement, the article speculates that cultural differences 
make it unlikely that they will truly join the cause. So far this perception 
has proven to be true. 
The second part of the article is dedicated to actual DRM-hacking cases. 
The presented cases are DeCSS and Jon Johansen, Adobe eBook and 
Dmitry Sklyarov, and Microsoft Media Player and Sony Aibo the Robotic 
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Dog. The first conclusion from the cases is that once information has 
been leaked to the Internet, it is impossible to remove it. The more the 
right holder fights to suppress the leak, the more attention it gets and the 
more widespread the distribution becomes. The worst strategy of all is to 
sue the individual developer, as a grassroots uproar is then inevitable. If 
the company makes no active public moves and just updates the systems 
against the hack, the information typically does not spread outside the 
core hacker circles. 
The article concludes by applying Keck and Sikkink’s (1998) measure of 
success for transnational advocacy networks: 
1. Issue attention, agenda setting, and information generation;
2. Discursive change, or establishing prescriptive status of norms;
3. Procedural changes, such as treaty ratification or 
cooperation within international organizations;
4. Changes in policies;
5. Influence on behavior of state and non-state actors.
The article argues that an anti-DRM network has reached at most level 
2. However, since the article has been written, there has been clear 
development of international organizations, especially at WIPO, and 
currently the level should be as high as 5.
3.1.2. Contributors to and contributions of the article
This article was written by the author. Mikko Välimäki’s contribution was 
limited in this case to general commenting, stylistic editions, and extensive 
proofreading. 
The biggest contribution of the article is extension of theory on transnational 
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advocacy networks of anti-DRM forces. To our knowledge, nobody has 
done it before and even today our work is unique in its category.  The 
article was also the first to describe how the process of DRM-hacking 
typically goes (figure 5) and is still fully valid five years after publication. 
The article also expanded “Streisand Effect”43 to DRM i.e. the more 
aggressively to right holder tries to remove certain information, the larger 
distribution it will get.
Figure 5. A typical process in a DRM-hacking case (Oksanen & Välimäki, 
2002, p. 160)
43. The term was not known at the time the article was written. See more info Greenberg, 2007. 
The article  includes information about recent breach of HD-DVD, which follows closely our 
model.
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3.2.  Article 2. DRM Interoperability and Intellectual Property 
Policy in Europe
3.2.1. The Main Content of the Article
The article covers three major themes. It first investigates in detail the 
current state of copyright legislation and court practice regarding DRM in 
the EU and United States pertaining to interoperability. The recent French 
interoperability law is also covered in this section. The French law would 
have introduced a true framework for full DRM interoperability. The text 
of the first version was written by local free software activists and would 
have introduced very far-reaching duties, e.g., giving full information 
compatibility information without a chance to ask for royalty payments. 
However, the law was watered down considerably in the French Senate, 
which was lobbied heavily by the media industry. The final version is 
rather meaningless since its requirements are seldom met:
- A regulatory authority will mediate interoperability requests; it 
has the power to impose fines of up to 5% of the global turnover 
if its decisions are not followed
- DRM provider can however escape interoperability requests (1) 
if it has
acceptance from all copyright holders to keep the format secret and 
noncompatible, or (2) if there is a security risk that the DRM could 
be then unusable because it would be generally circumvented
- Licensing terms for interoperability information must be 
nondiscriminatory
and may have reasonable royalties; obviously the regulatory 
authority will finally decide whether the DRM provider can 
prevent open source implementations. 
The second part of the article is dedicated to competition law and 
interoperability. The article explains the current state of EU-level 
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regulation, which is based on the European Court of Justice’s Magill and 
IMS Health decisions. The article also covers a recent French case against 
Apple iTunes, in which the outcome was as follows:
In its decision, the council noted that it was still too early to define 
markets for DRM and thus it was unclear whether Apple’s FairPlay 
was in a dominant position in that market. The council especially 
mentioned Microsoft’s WMA standard as a competitor that might 
be in a more powerful position. Further, even though Apple might 
have had dominance in the markets for portable players (iPod), it 
did not abuse that market power since there were multiple sources 
to get music to iPod. iTunes downloads were only a minor share 
of the total.
The third part of the article covers the recent entry of consumer protection 
authorities to the digital markets. The article explains how the Norwegian 
Consumer Ombudsman has started a process to force Apple to open up 
its FairTunes-DRM. 
3.2.2. Contributors to and Contributions of the Article
The author of this dissertation wrote the sections about the United States 
and Consumer Protection Law and also contributed to other sections, 
especially to the conclusions of the article. 
The main contribution of the article is its discussion of how DRM-
interoperability could best be archived by using the aforementioned three 
legal tools.  To our knowledge, nobody had tried to compare these three 
approaches regarding interoperability. Our conclusions are summarized 
in table 8.
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Legislation Pros Cons Forum for 
changes
Copyright law Strikes to the root of 
problem, prone to ex-
tensive rent-seeking
Very hard to 
change
WIPO, EU
Competition law The active role of 
courts makes rent 
seeking more difficult 
compared to fully po-
litical process
Very slow, only 
against already 
dominant players
EU
Consumer protec-
tion law
Quick, potentially very 
powerful
Only in consumer 
relations
M e m b e r 
countries
Table 8. Pros and cons
However, since this article was published, the Microsoft case was decided 
by the Court of First Instance. As we had hoped in the article, the court 
agreed with the Commission and considerably expanded the duty of 
disclosure of information required for creating interoperable systems. 
However, the case may not be widely applicable on a general level, because 
it is tied to the specific facts of the case. For example, Thomas Vinje (one 
of the main litigators in the case), argues that Apple was not affected by 
the decision:
The relevant market is the online sale of music. It’s basically music 
stores. And there’s no lock-in there. There’s no platform protected 
by an applications barrier to entry. Apple has a whatever, 70% 
market share, it’s been tremendously successful. It doesn’t have 
any way of locking customers in. I mean, they can choose. I could 
choose to go buy a Samsung player, for example, and download 
music from plenty of other places than the Apple store. And so the 
circumstances are totally different. There’s no platform, there’s no 
95% market share over a long period, 10–15 years, protected by an 
applications barrier to entry. So the Commission said, “We’re not 
going to pursue this case, because Apple doesn’t have a dominant 
position.” (Daly, 2007)
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3.3. Article 3. Theory of Deterrence and Individual Behaviour: 
Can Lawsuits Control File Sharing on the Internet?
3.3.1. Main content of the article
The article is divided into two relatively separate parts. The first one is 
historical. We show how the Internet has been used for distribution of 
(allegedly) copyright infringing works, as long as there have been tools 
to do so. The discussion and the arguments remain surprisingly similar; 
only the scope has changed. We also document in detail the first major 
net-based copyright fight: Scientology vs. Alt.Religion.Scientology. That 
case laid the foundation for some of the core principles of current Internet 
regulations. For example, Internet operators were protected against 
copyright infringement claims as long as they acted as mere “pipe” between 
their customers. The case also made it abundantly clear that once certain 
information ends up on the Internet, it is practically impossible to remove 
it with either technical or legal means. 
The second part of the article analyzes the effectiveness of the music 
industry’s lawsuits against P2P file sharing. We first create a simplified 
formula to describe different factors affecting users’ decision to participate 
in file sharing. Here we use the assumption from “traditional” law and 
economics that a rational user stops file sharing only if the costs exceed 
the benefits. Here the outcome is that risk of being sued is so small that 
it does not prevent participation. Both the collected anecdotal evidence 
and real data from companies that track P2P traffic seem to support this 
conclusion; i.e., lawsuits have not had a radical effect on file sharing
However, as described in 3.1.2 and in the article, we argue that assumption 
that a person would act fully rationally is wrong. Therefore the article 
describes the kinds of changes that should be made to the basic assumptions. 
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The first and perhaps most important factor here is that individuals tend 
to favor a substantial probability of larger loss to a certain limited loss.44 
This means that even if the cost of file sharing is more expensive (in terms 
of legal risk) than buying the music legally, the users will still download 
the music. However, there are several other factors. For example, people 
overestimate those risks, as they got a lot of publicity. However, once a risk 
becomes “too ordinary,” people will underestimate it.  In addition, costs 
and benefits of participating and getting caught, in terms of a person’s 
reputation, should be taken into consideration. The article then looks for 
anecdotal evidence of these factors. At least among technology-oriented 
users, file sharing seems to carry very little social stigma. The reputation 
of record and movie industries is so low that there is just no social norm 
against violating their rights.45 
 Finally, the article describes how a very widely publicized police raid of 
the biggest BitTorrent site in Finland had only short-term effects (figure 
6), which can be explained by the fact that users had merely to find a new 
service to continue their habit. 
44. The counter-argument for this is that people still buy insurances and that is almost 
analogical situation. However, the framing here is perhaps different enough to explain situation 
- insurances aim to sustain status quo that is not the case with illegal downloading. However, 
this contradiction is something that should be possible to study empirically to find out how 
people behave in “real world”.
45. The situation has most likely only worsened since the article was written. For example, The 
Consumerist found in its nonscientific vote that RIAA was the worst company in America in 
2006. It beat the previous year’s winner, Halliburton Corp.
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Figure 6. Combined traffic of Finnish Internet operators (source Ficix, http://
stats.lanwan.fi/ficix/)
3.3.2. Contributors to and Contributions of the Article
The article was otherwise written by the author, but Mikko Välimäki 
wrote the section about Finnreactor. Välimäki also contributed to the 
introduction and conclusions.
The article makes two major contributions. The most important one is 
the application of behavioral law and economics to file sharing.  To our 
knowledge, our article was the first to take this approach. We show that as 
long as the content industry cannot establish a strong social norm against 
file sharing, court cases alone won’t work. The industry seems to have 
realized this at least partially but as long as their reputation is as bad as 
it is, there is not much they can do. For example, harsher penalties are 
unlikely to work because they would be solemnly against what people 
currently consider fair and consequently only worsen the situation.
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Secondly, the article documents in detail one of the most interesting aspects 
of the history of copyright on the Internet, i.e., the struggle of Scientology 
to prevent distribution of their secret course materials. That case, which 
happened before modern P2P technology, already offered strong evidence 
that it is very hard to suppress dedicated net users from distributing 
“forbidden” material by technological or legal means. 
 
3.4. Article 4. Free Software and Copyright Enforcement: A Tool 
for Global Copyright Policy? 
3.4.1. Main Content of the Article
The article is divided into three parts. It starts by introducing the reader to 
the history of free software. The article shows how informal enforcement 
has been very effective in protecting adherence to free software licenses. 
The most common tools used against violators are:
- Pressure in online discussions;
- E-mails from “volunteer legal counsels“; and
- Threat of negative publicity
 
The formal enforcement of licenses in court is not favored by most of the 
projects. This is due partly to the fact that free software developers have 
strong and negative ideological views toward default copyright rules; i.e., 
they consider the current system to be something that unnecessarily limits 
the freedom of users and developers.
In the second part of the article we show how trade-related enforcement of 
traditional copyright in software is pushing developing countries toward 
free software. The reason is quite understandable: increased enforcement 
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makes proprietary software more expensive, as the option of pirated 
versions is not available while free software remains “free as beer.” Thus 
countries like China, Vietnam, and Brazil increasingly favor free software 
in their procurement processes.
In the third part of the article we discuss the political aspects of the 
situation. The article shows how WIPO has not covered free software as 
certain member states (especially the United States) have so far opposed 
it. 
3.4.2. Contributors to and Contributions of the Article
The article was written by the author. Mikko Välimäki contributed some 
comments and section 2.1. about the history of GNU GPL.
There are three main contributions of the article. First, it demonstrates 
that it is possible to establish a strong social norm to “respect copyright 
holder’s rights” and enforce it (mostly) by informal means. This is especially 
important (see the previous article) as the traditional enforcement of 
copyright is likely to become harder (see the next article). 
Second, the article shows that developing nations act rationally and use 
free software as a tool to limit the negative effects of increasing copyright 
enforcement. The companies pushing for more enforcement act similarly 
rationally and use lobbying to minimize the movement toward free 
software. We thus lay the foundation for further research into how this 
“game” proceeds. 
Finally, we are most likely first to suggest that WIPO could actually use 
free software as an example of why copyright is something that is actually 
good to enforce. Even if the ideological background of the free software 
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movement is hostile toward the general notion of intellectual property 
rights, the community is still willing to protect the rights of software 
authors.
3.5. Article 5. Copyright Levies as an Alternative Compensation 
Method for Recording Artists and Technological 
Development
3.5.1. The Main Content of the Article
The article is divided into three sections. It first describes alternative solutions 
that are available for selling copyrighted works. Special attention is given 
to models that extend a system of levies to the Internet. These systems are 
based mostly on the idea that P2P traffic is monitored or sampled to get 
statistics; these could be used to distribute the money collected from ISPs 
and/or hardware vendors. The main critique of the proposed system is 
introduced as well as our own model, which would allow users to vote on 
how their money would be used and would be based only secondarily on 
collected statistics.
In the second part we analyze whether it would be possible to introduce 
such a system into Finland. The question is divided into two parts: 
economical and legal. We conclude that with the current broadband user 
base it would be easy to collect enough money to offset revenues from CD 
sales. However, the current legal framework is unlikely be interoperable 
with such a system and at least EUCD and the Finnish copyright act would 
have to be changed first.
In the last part we use some very simple calculations to show that the road 
of traditional copyright enforcement is going to end soon. We identify the 
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rise of storage capacity and wireless transfer speed as two main disruptive 
technologies. In our statistic model the “effective” fines for preventing 
private file sharing (which is still legal, at least in Finland)  in a few years 
could be as high as 100 billion euros!
3.5.2. Contributors to and Contributions of the Article
The article was otherwise written by the author of this dissertation; Mikko 
Välimäki wrote section 3.1. and added the voting component to the levy 
model. 
The article makes two main contributions. First, it shows that from a 
purely static economic perspective, it would be possible to establish a 
fully levy-based system to Finland. However, current legislation makes it 
impossible. Even if the legal problems were solved, many questions would 
remain open, such as who would decide the sum of collected money and 
on what grounds it could be changed.
The second contribution is our brief look toward the future. The current 
copyright discourse is badly stuck at the current technological level even 
if it is still relatively easy to predict the development with a 5–10-year 
perspective. Considering that most of the legislative processes pertaining to 
copyright tend to take several years anyway, we found it odd that nobody 
seems to be concerned about what is just around the corner. 
We show that traditional enforcement of copyright will be next to 
impossible, because users will be able to bypass the current choke points 
(as seen in figure 6) by using distributed mobile “mesh” networks or 
“sneakernets,” i.e., portable hard drives capable of transferring extreme 
large amounts of content. 
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Figure /. The change towards a system without choke points
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4. Conclusions
The main outcome of this dissertation can be summarized in one sentence; 
however, the justifications for it require slightly longer discussion. The first 
article shows that digital rights management is very hard to implement in 
order to protect content without annoying users. It is even harder to create 
protection that would survive attacks from dedicated hackers. The only 
real option is to create a system that is possible to update after a breach. 
However, that does not help if the already distributed works can be released 
from the DRM envelope after a breach. For example, AACS protection, 
which is used in both HD-DVD and Blue Ray discs, has already been 
broken a few times; as a result, the already published titles are completely 
vulnerable to copying. 
In addition, there is a strong push in the markets against DRM. Apple, the 
biggest music retailer, is already selling some of its material without DRM, 
and its current main competitors, eMusic and Amazon, are offering all their 
music without DRM. The distribution of films is still in the early stages 
compared with music, but there is already at least plans to  offers movies 
without DRM. Furthermore, the European regulative push (based on both 
competition law and consumer protection law) against non-interoperable 
DRM systems is making future investments less profitable since it is much 
riskier to use DRM to tie customers to a single vendor.
Therefore, there seems to be a strong case that DRM won’t save copyright, 
and the answer to research question one is no.
The second option, stronger enforcement, is also unlikely to work. First, 
it alienates the people from the content industry. As described in Article 1, 
the “martyrs” who can give human face to the struggle are very efficient 
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tools for advocacy, and mass-scale court cases inevitable create them. 
Furthermore, forthcoming technology will make enforcement on a practical 
level extremely hard. Content will spread from hand to hand (or from one 
mobile terminal to other). If a person is able to store a year’s worth of 
music in his or her pocket and share it with peers, enforcement against this 
kind of behavior would require such strong privacy-violating measures 
that even our terrorist-scared society is not ready to accept them.
The answer to the second research question is therefore that enforcement 
is already very hard and it will basically become futile in the future for 
certain categories of works, i.e., anything that can be consumed at home 
without interaction with the outside, including movies, music, etc.
If technical protection measures and enforcement are not going to rescue 
copyright, what is left on the table? One common answer is to extend the 
current levy system. This might actually work for a while but there are 
some caveats. For example, what would be a fair levy for a hard drive 
that can hold 10 terabytes of information that could be anything from 
free software, family HD videos, porn, and music to the full content of the 
Library of the Congress? In addition, if everything goes as planned for a 
“ubiquitous society,” everyone will have more storage capacity than there 
is information to store. As a consequence, any levy system would soon 
turn into a flat governmental tax that would somehow be distributed to 
the content creating class. This kind of “socialized” content production is 
actually a real possibility but a very problematic one. Even in the Soviet 
Union the production of creative content was not part of the centralized 
system (Newcity, 1978).   
We are now ready to move to the final outcome of this dissertation. The 
copyright system is quickly vanishing as a way to financially support 
content production, at least in certain categories of works, i.e., music 
and movies. New models to support creative works will emerge only if a 
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strong social norm that requires “giving authors what authors’ are due” 
can be established. No technical or legal solution will help if this cannot 
be achieved and soon. The change has to happen first and foremost in the 
hearts of the people but reasonable business models don’t hurt, either.
This means basically that people have to learn to support the creative class 
because they want to do it, not because it is dictated by the law.46 If we 
look to the history of creative production, it is possible to make the case 
that this is indeed possible. During most of history, patronage has played 
a central role as a way to ensure a livelihood for artists. Considering that 
the cost of making both music and movies has come down considerably 
during the digital revolution, there is also a lot less need for capital. The 
change won’t happen easily, but in the end most people want to do the 
right thing—even if that would be irrational from the perspective of 
classical economic theory.
46. A person who is more familiar with philosophy might say that the copyright system should 
work in such a way that it fulfils Kant’s Categorical Imperative (see Kimppa, pp. 24-25).
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